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STATE OF UTAH 
HOLMGREN BROTHERS, INC., a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
GERALD BALLARD a/k/a THOMAS 
G. BALLARD & WINONA BAL-
LARD, his wife & S E Y M O U R 
GREAVES, a single man, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff in the above entitled case brought action 
pursuant to an oral contract for the sale of real property 
between defendants-sellers and plaintiff-buyer. Plaintiff 
complains that defendants have refused to complete the 
sale of the property pursxiant to that oral contract and 
asks for specific performance of that contract or dam-
ages. Defendants assert that said sale is void under the 
statute of frauds. 
Case No. 
13844 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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DISPOSITION OF CASE IN LOWER COURT 
The District Court of Box Elder County, Judge 
VeNoy Christofferson presiding, ruled that defendants 
execute and deliver a warranty deed to plaintiff and that 
plaintiff pay to defendants $18,500.00. The court further 
ruled that defendants deliver to the court a deed from 
the prior record owner of the property in question; re-
strained defendants from going on the property and 
awarded plaintiff costs. 
NATURE OF RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants seek dismissal of the action in that the 
oral contract for the sale of the property is void under 
the statute of frauds, U. C. A. 25-5-3. In the alternative, 
defendants submit that the lower court erred in requiring 
specific performance of the oral agreement and that the 
matter should be remanded to the trial court with in-
structions that plaintiff prove the value of the services 
performed and benefits conferred by him on defendants 
in order for any recovery. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In June 1973 Gerald Ballard (hereafter defendant) 
orally agreed with Holmgren Brothers, Inc. (hereafter 
plaintiff) to convey to plaintiff approximately 160 acres 
of real property situated in Hansel Valley, Box Elder 
County (Tr. 4, 5). Defendant thought the property was 
free and clear and intended to convey title to plaintiff 
as it then stood (Tr. 8,14,15,16). However, at that time 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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defendant was subject to several outstanding judgments 
and plaintiff insisted that these judgments be paid prior 
to dosing the sale (Tr. 10, 43, 44). Defendant objected 
to this arrangement and informed plaintiff that he was 
unwilling to sell the subject property under the terms 
insisted on by plaintiff (Tr. 8, 9, 39, 45, 50). Plaintiff 
then placed with Jack Shumway a check made payable 
to First Security Bank Agent for the amount of the pur-
chase price which check was to be forwarded to defen-
dant at some future date (Tr. 17-23). This check was 
never delivered to defendant and defendant was never 
paid for the land (Tr. 23, 44). Defendant refused to 
allow plaintiff to take possession of the subject property 
(Tr. 8). Subsequently plaintiff visited defendant on at 
least two occasions to see if it was still possible to put 
the deal together (Tr. 45). 
In late August or early September, plaintiff and de-
fendant discussed weeding of the property and plaintiff 
was given permission by defendant to enter upon and 
weed the property for the purpose of protecting plain-
tiff's possible future investment (Tr. 8, 46). At that time 
the sale was still uncertain (Tr. 46, 47). Shortly there-
after defendant finally and completely repudiated and 
withdrew the offer and oral contract of sale (Tr. 8, 9, 39, 
45, 50). Approximately one week later, after consulting 
with his attorney, plaintiff entered the property without 
permission for the purpose of disking and planting the 
ground (Tr. 49). Plaintiff admitted that he was told by 
defendant that the "deal was off" about one week prior 
to the date he disked and planted the property and that 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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part of plaintiff's motive in disking and planting the 
property was to help enforce the oral contract by avoid-
ing the statute of frauds (Tr. 39, 49). There was never 
any writing setting forth the terms of the oral agreement 
and Mrs. Ballard was not included in any of the discus-
sions of sale (Tr. 47, 50). Plaintiff then brought the 




THE P L A I N T I F F SHOULD NOT BE 
GRANTED SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE OF 
THE ORAL CONTRACT FOR THE SALE OF 
LAND BETWEEN HOLMGREN BROTH-
ERS, INC. AND GERALD BALLARD BE-
CAUSE THAT CONTRACT IS VOID UN-
DER 25-5-3 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED (1973 
Supp.). 
25-5-3 Utah Code Annotated (1973 Supp.) states: 
Every contract for . . . the sale of any lands, or 
any interest in lands, shall be void unless the 
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, 
is in writing subscribed by the party by whom 
the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful 
agent thereunto authorized in writing. 
The alleged contract for the sale of land between plain-
tiff and defendant was not in writing and there was no 
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written note or memorandum of said alleged contract. 
Thus the alleged agreement clearly falls within U. C. A. 
25-5-3 and is therefore void. This is true even where the 
terms of the oral contract are perfectly clear; the oral 
contract is still void under the statute of frauds, Woolley 
Loose, 57 Utah 336, 194 P. 908 (1920). 
POINT II. 
THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT PART 
PERFORMANCE BY PLAINTIFF TO TAKE 
THE ORAL CONTRACT OUT OF THE 
STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
Under certain narrow cidcumstances an oral contract 
is enforced by the courts as an exception to U. C. A. 25-
5-3 under U. C. A. 25-5-8 which allows the courts to com-
pel specific performance in cases where sufficient partial 
performance of the oral contract has been completed. 
The Utah Supreme Court has adopted minimum 
standards for partial performance which must be met if 
the statute of frauds is to be avoided. As discussed here-
inafter, to avoid the statute of frauds or to invoke es-
toppel to assert the statute of frauds, a three part test 
must be met: 
(1) There must be possession with the acquies-
cence of the seller, (2) there must be material improve-
ments on the land, (3) there must be payment for the 
land. 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
6 
In addition, in order for the appropriate remedy to 
be specific performance, a four part test must be met: 
(1) The person performing must rely on the oral 
contract to his detriment or injury, (2) the injury must 
be of a sort that is not compensable through other means, 
(3) enforcement of the statute of frauds must otherwise 
operate to perpetrate a fraud on the performer, and (4) 
the terms of the oral contract must be clear and certain. 
An examination of each of these elements shows the 
plaintiff to have no cause of action in the instant case. 
(a) Plaintiff did not have possession of the prop-
erty with the acquiescence of defendant. 
Mere presence on the land does not constitute pos-
session. Possession must not only be actual and open 
but it must also be definite and exclusive, and not con-
current with that of the vendor. It must indicate the 
commencement of a new estate or interest. Price v. 
Lloyd, 31 Utah 86, 86 P. 767 (1906). In In re Madsen's 
Estate, 123 Utah 327, 359 P. 2d 595 (1953), the court de-
fined partial performance as "at least partial payment 
plus possession with the acquiescence or consent of the 
seller.9' In the same case the court held that possession 
must pass under the contract. 
In the instant case plaintiff's presence on the land 
was clearly not possessory. First, the weeding activity 
was only engaged in to protect a possible future invest-
ment or interest. Defendant arranged to pay plain-
tiff for the value of that work in the event the sale was 
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not consummated (Tr. 8, 9). It was not a possessory act 
and did not constitute partial performance. Holmgren 
did not rely on the oral agreement of sale, but instead 
went to Ballard and discussed the weeding with him. 
He asked and was granted permission to enter upon the 
land for the purpose of weeding and there was an actual 
or implied separate agreement for the weeding (Tr. 8, 
9,46). 
Second, the disking and planting done by plaintiff 
were performed only after defendant expressly withdrew 
and repudiated any offer or oral contract of sale. Plain-
tiff thus did not rely on the oral contract in acting to 
disk and plant the ground. He performed only after con-
sulting with counsel and approximately one week after 
defendant repudiated the oral contract (Tr. 49). Im-
mediately after planting was begun, plaintiff was again 
approached by defendant and told that defendant was 
unwilling to sell the ground and to stop planting and 
leave the property (Tr. 50). Plaintiff acted not in reli-
ance upon the oral contract, but after the fact, in the 
express and admitted desire to avoid the statute of frauds 
(Tr. 39, 48, 69). Plaintiff's acts were not in good faith, 
and under the circumstances, to specifically enforce the 
oral contract would work a fraud on defendant. 
All possessory acts by plaintiff were made only after 
the agreement was clearly repudiated by defendant on 
at least two occasions and those actions and the risks 
appurtenant thereto were taken voluntarily by plaintiff 
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and alternative remedies are available to compensate 
for the weeding and planting if appropriate. 
(b) Plaintiff did not make improvements on the 
land sufficient to be considered as part perform-
<mce. 
Merely making improvements will not alone take an 
oral contract out of the statute of frauds, Clark v. Clark, 
74 Utah 290, 279 P. 509 (1929). Improvements must be 
permanent and valuable in nature to be considered as 
partial performance. In Price v. Lloyd, supra, the court 
held that such improvements must have a substantial 
or permanent character. The improvements must be per-
manently beneficial to the land and involve a sacrifice 
to him who made them. They must be made in reliance 
on the oral contract (see also In re Madsen's Estate, 
supra), and the value of the improvements made must 
exceed the rental value of the premises. 
[The improvements must be] regarded as of such 
a substantial value and character as to consti-
tute part performance so as to take the case out 
of the statute. Price v. Lloyd, supra. 
Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Mining 
Co., 103 Utah 249, 134 P. 2d 1094 (1943), discusses the 
standard of sufficiency for improvements for partial per-
formance as adopted by the Utah Supreme Court. In 
Mercur, the court required the financial investment to 
be of major proportion to the property in order to con-
stitute part performance. In that case, the improvements 
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were not only permanent and valuable, they were also 
unique and therefore not compensable through money 
damages. In addition, Price v. Lloyd, supra, held that 
a finding based on the evidence that the improvements 
made to the subject property were permanent and valu-
able is required before the court can take notice of such 
facts. And Boston v. Wycoff, 4 Utah 2d 386, 295 P. 2d 
332 (1956), requires the possession and improvements to 
be in reliance on the oral contract and requires detriment 
or injury to the party relying on the oral contract. 
In the instant case the weeding did not constitute 
a permanent improvement. It is rather the type of im-
provement that a tenant on land might make which is 
distinguished from a permanent improvement in Price 
v. Lloyd, supra. An alternative remedy that defendant 
pay plaintiff for the weeding performed is clearly avail-
able. 
Further, the disking and planting were not sufficient 
improvements under the partial performance standard 
to avoid the requirements of the statute of frauds. 
Neither disking nor planting is a permanent improve-
ment. Since the planting, plaintiff has harvested and sold 
the wheat planted. By the date of trial the property was 
substantially in the same condition that it was in at the 
date of the oral contract for sale. 
Plaintiff has received the benefit of the use of the 
land without paying any compensation to defendant in 
the form of rent or otherwise. It is noted that there has 
been no evidence placed before the court by the plaintiff 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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showing the amount of damages suffered through plant-
ing and disking the land. Plaintiff made no permanent 
improvements on the land. 
(c) Defendant was never paid for the land. 
The evidence indicates that the only payment made 
by plaintiff was in the form of a check made payable to 
First Security Bank, Agent, and delivered to Jack Shum-
wayl, an officer of said bank, which payment was to be 
forwarded to defendant at some future date (Tr. 17-33). 
Defendant never received that payment (Tr. 23, 24). De-
fendant never asked for payment (Tr. 23) and plaintiff 
never instructed Mr. Shumway to deliver the payment 
to defendant (Tr. 23, 44). 
Even if payment had been made it is clear that mere 
payment of pecuniary consideration is not sufficient jus-
tification for specifically enforcing an oral contract to 
convey land. 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS §494, 
Ravarino v. Price, 123 Utah 559, 260 P. 2d 570 (1953), 
33 A. L. R. 579 (1924). 
The instant case fails entirely to meet this standard 
for avoiding the statute of frauds. The tender of pay-
ment was not to nor has it ever been in the possession 
of defendant. It was a check made out to a third party 
and tendered to that third party. It was never paid to 
defendant and plaintiff suffered no injury or detriment 
as a result of placing the check which was never cashed 
in the hands of said third party. 
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(d) Specific performance is not an appropriate 
remedy in this case. 
Specific performance is an extreme remedy. It should 
be used only when no other remedy would be adequate 
and any other remedy would result in a fraud being 
worked on the performing party and is not applicable 
in this case: 
(1) As already discussed, plaintiff did not rely on 
the oral contract in entering on or working on the prop-
erty, 
(2) All improvements made by plaintiff are com-
pensable without specific performance. 
(3) In order for a fraud to be perpetrated the 
party performing must be acting in good faith and the 
performance must be of such a nature so as not to be 
compensable except through specific performance. Baugh 
v. Barley, 112 Utah 1, 184 P. 2d 335 (1947): 
Utah law is clear that to enforce the con-
tract in equity the services rendered must be 
of such nature that the value thereof cannot be 
ascertained with reasonable accuracy in an ac-
tion at law, and be adequately compensated for 
by the recovery of damages. Brinton v. Van 
Cott, 8 Utah 480, 33 P. 218, (1898), Randall v. 
Tracy Collins Trust Company, 6 Utah 2d 18, 305 
P. 2d 480 (1956). 
The case law clearly requires the perpetration of a 
fraud as a minimum standard for avoiding the statute of 
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frauds. The doctrine of part performance is only to be 
applied with great care, with particular attention to the 
statute of frauds and the historical precedent therefore. 
In the case of Ravarino v. Price, supra, where the court 
held that a tender of purchase price plus related acts 
of partial performance were not sufficient to take the 
oral contract out of the statute of frauds, the court ar-
ticulated the following standard: 
Courts of equity, in establishing the doctrine 
involved by plaintiff have not, by any means, 
intended to annul the statute of frauds, but only 
to prevent its being made the means of perpe-
trating fraud. In order that a plaintiff may be 
permitted to give evidence of a contract not in 
writing, and which is in the very teeth of the 
statute and a nullity of law, it is essential that 
he establish, by clear and positive proof, acts 
and things done in pursuance and on account 
thereof, exclusively referable thereto and which 
take it out of the operation of the statute. (Em-
phasis added.) 
In Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold Min-
ing, supra, the Supreme Court held that partial perform-
ance which will avoid the statute of frauds must consist 
of an act which puts the party performing in such a posi-
tion that the non-performance of the other party would 
constitute fraud. Thus the statute of frauds, the case 
law, and U. C. A. 25-5-3 require the circumstance of fraud 
to exist before partial performance is allowed to compel 
specific performance of the contract. In addition, the 
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cases require that the performing party be injured and 
that such injury be unjust and unconscionable, such that 
there is no complete or adequate remedy at law. 
In Easton v. Wycoff, supra, the court in denying 
an equitable estoppel argument to assert the statute of 
frauds stated, 
It is an indispensable element of equitable es-
toppel that the person relying thereon must have 
been induced to act or alter his position to his 
detriment or injury and where equitable estoppel 
is relied on to preclude another from asserting 
the statute of frauds as a defense to an oral 
contract. . . such injury must be unjust and un-
conscionable, and such that there is no complete 
and adequate remedy at law available to the 
person asserting equitable estoppel. (Emphasis 
added.) 
It is clear that fraud is a necessary element of any 
argument that an oral contract for the sale of land should 
be specifically enforced. Yet plaintiff has failed to even 
mention fraud at any place in the record (R. 88-90, 97-
101). Rule 9 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure re-
quires that fraud be plead with particularity. 
Rule 9. Pleading Special Matters. 
(b) Fraud, Mistake, Condition of the Mind. 
In all averments of fraud or mistake, the circum-
stances constituting fraud or mistake shall be 
stated with particularity. Malice, intent, knowl-
edge, and other condition of mind of a person 
may be averred generally. 
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In the instant case failure to specifically enforce this 
contract will clearly not work a fraud on plaintiff. Plain-
tiff fails to meet any of the standards for fraud herein 
set forth. 
(4) In addition, to enforce an oral contract by waiv-
ing the statute of frauds the terms of that oral contract 
must be established to a greater degree of certainty than 
would be required to establish the same contract in an 
action where the contract is written. Montgomery v. 
Barrett, 40 Utah 385, 121 P. 569 (1912). The oral agree*-
ment between the parties here is not clear and unambigu-
ous as required by law. There is disagreement as to a 
material fact. Plaintiff alleges that defendant was re-
quired as part of the oral agreement to first pay off his 
existing judgments. Defendant contends that that was 
not part of the oral agreement. Therefore, the first stan-
dard for avoiding the statute of frauds, that of clear 
specificity of agreement, has not been met. The statute 
was designed to prevent this kind of contention over 
terms in contracts for the sale of land. Furthermore, Mrs. 
Ballard was not included in any of the discussions or 
agreements of sale (Tr. 47, 50). 
The terms of this oral contract are not clear enough 
to be specifically enforced in equity. This issue goes to 
the heart of the alleged oral contract and reinforces the 
statutory requirement of writing. Such oral contracts 
are void. Utah Code Annotated, 25-5-3 (1973 Supp.). 
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CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has completely failed to meet standards 
accepted by the Utah Supreme Court for partial per-
formance sufficient to avoid the statute of frauds. The 
partial performance did not meet the Mercur or the Price 
v. Lloyd standard and material parts of the agreement 
are unclear. All of the improvements made are compensa-
ble without the requirment of specific performance. None 
are permanent or unique. 
There was never possession with the acquiescence 
or consent of the seller. The weeding was not possessory 
under the oral contract. The weeding was done by sepa-
rate agreement between the parties to protect the possi-
ble future interest that plaintiff might have in the land. 
The later entry on the land for planting was done 
only after the repudiation of the oral contract. Defen-
dant clearly objected to any possession by plaintiff and 
plaintiff knew that he entered the land in violation of 
the defendant's rights and wishes. There was no reliance 
by plaintiff on the oral contract. He acted not in good 
faith, but with the express purpose of avoiding the stat-
ute of frauds. 
The statute of frauds is a valid and necessary part 
of the body of law of the state of Utah. Part of its value 
lies in promoting certainty in contracting. This is evi-
dent in the instant case. The parties never had a meet-
ing of the minds. The terms of the purchase and sale 
were never clear as between the parties and plaintiff's 
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claim for specific performance is exactly the kind of abuse 
the statute is designed to prevent. 
The late Professor Karl Llewellyn is quoted as say-
After two centuries and a half the statute stands, 
in essence better adapted to our needs than when 
it was first passed . . . [Tjhe net effect of the 
two rules together [the statute and the parol evi-
dence rule], as they work into lay practice, and 
viewed simply in their effect outside of litiga-
tion, is almost certainly wholesome; both en-
couraging permanent trustworthy record of 
agreements, and in inducing care in the making 
of that record. 
Llewellyn, Contracts — An Essay in Perspective, 
40 Yale L. J. 704, 747-48 (1931). 
Respectfully submitted, 
W. Eugene Hansen 
C. Jeffrey Thompson 
HANSEN & ORTON 
410 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Sherma Hansen 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
Attorneys for 
Defendants and Appellants 
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